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INTERPRETATION, CONSTRUCTION, AND REVISION
OF THE COMMERCIAL CODE: THE PRESUMPTION
OF HOLDING IN DUE COURSE
FREDERICK K. BEUTEL*
It is usually assumed that the codification of the law or of a particular
statute goes through four stages. These are drafting, enactment, interpreta-
tion, and revision.
Due to a number of unusual circumstances, the history of the Uniform
Commercial Code has not clearly followed these steps. So as a preliminary
matter it might be beneficial briefly to review it.
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DRAFTING AND
ADOPTION OF THE COMMERCIAL CODE
In the beginning the Code was attempted as a revision and single codi-
fication of a number of already existing and very successful uniform statutes
together with a large number of other legislative acts more or less uniformly
adopted in most of the states.' After considerable discussion over a period
of about ten years,' the sponsoring organizations, the Commissioners on
*Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
1. For a list of the seven uniform acts repealed by the Uniform Commercial Code
[hereinafter cited and referred to as U.C.C.] see U.C.C. § 10-102. They are: Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Act, Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, Uniform Sales Act, Uni-
form Bills of Lading Act, Uniform Stock Transfer Act, Uniform Conditional Sales Act,
and Uniform Trust Receipts Act [hereinafter cited and referred to as N.I.L., W.R.A.,
S.A., B.L.A., S.T.A., C.S.A., and T.R.A., respectively.] It also lists acts on seven other
subjects which should be repealed. The exact wording of this section must, of course, vary
in each of the jurisdictions adopting the U.C.C., depending upon the state of the commer-
cial statutes in each state.
2. As far back as 1932 the writer recommended complete codification of the uni-
form commercial laws. Beutel, The Negotiable Instruments Act Should Not Be Amended,
80 U. PA. L. Rzv. 368, 385 (1932). See also BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
1124 (5th ed. Beutel 1932); Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Bank Collections Act and
Possibility of Recodification of the Law on Negotiable Instruments, 9 TUL. L. Rrv. 378
(1935).
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Uniform Laws and the American Law Institute, got down to the serious
problems of drafting the Code in 1945.' The procedure for drafting was
that used by the American Law Institute for creating the Restatements of the
Law and by the Commission on Uniform Laws for drafting the other Uni-
form Laws. The details of this process have been ably set out elsewhere and
need not be repeated here.
It is sufficient to say that the Institute and the Commission published the
usual preliminary drafts and invited criticism, which was voluminous and
not always appreciated or followed by the draftsmen. In fact, some of the
exchanges on the merits at times became bitter.4 However, the Code con-
tinued on its way, was offered in final draft in 1952' and adopted in Penn-
sylvania the next year.' It was also introduced into the legislatures of a
number of states including New York.' Here one of the most significant
parts of the development of the Code occurred.
The Code in its entirety was referred by the Legislature and the Governor
to the Law Revision Commission of the State of New York for study and
recommendation. The Commission laid aside all other work, held hearings,
and, in cooperation with the Commission on Uniform Laws, the American
Law Institute, and other bodies,' made exhaustive and scholarly studies of
the Code and its effect on the law of New York. After three years and the
expenditure of over $300,000' the Commission published its work in three
volumes of studies,"° two volumes of hearings," and a one-volume report."2
The result was a vindication of the critics of the Code. While approving
the project of codification of the commercial law, the Commission's report
concluded:
3. Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM.
L. Rav. 798, 800 (1958).
4. Compare Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should Not Be
Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334, 356-57 (1952), with Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial
Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 YALE L.J. 364 (1952).
. For an exhaustive bibliography of this discussion see 1 State of New York, Report
of the Law Revision Commission and Record of Hearings on the Uniform Commercial
Code 37-64 (1954). [hereinafter cited as N.Y.L.R.C. Hearings (1954)].
5. U.C.C. Official Draft (1952).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 (1954).
7. See 1 N.Y.L.R.C. Hearings 7 (1954).
8. State of New York, Report of the Law Revision Commission, Report Relating to
the Uniform Commercial Code 7 (1956) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.L.R.C. Report
(1956)].
9. See Braucher, supra note 3, at 803.
10. 1-3 State of New York, Report of the Law Revision Commission, Study of the
Uniform Commercial Code (1955) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.L.R.C. Study (1955).]
11. 1-2 N.Y.L.R.C. Hearings (1954).
12. N.Y.L.R.C. Report (1956).
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A uniform codification of commercial law has advantages outweigh-
ing disadvantages only if the codification is satisfactory in scope, or-
ganization and integration with the general body of law, as well as in
its specific provisions. The Commission believes that it is clear, from
the criticisms indicated in this Report, that the Uniform Commercial
Code is not satisfactory in its present form and cannot be made satis-
factory without comprehensive re-examination and revision in the light
of all critical comment obtainable. The needed re-examination and
revision will require both time and money, and constant consultation
with the various groups affected."
One cannot read the whole report and its supporting materials without
concluding that it was a thorough rejection of the Commercial Code as it
was then written.
It at once became evident that this repudiation of the 1952 draft after its
enactment in only one state would be the death of the Uniform Commercial
Code unless something drastic was immediately done about it. The backers
of the Code were quick to respond. The enlarged Editorial Board of the
two sponsoring organizations had already been reactivated to work with
the New York Law Revision Commission,"4 and a subcommittee of new
experts" for each article was formed to rework the Code to meet objections.
Although the backers of the Code publicly played down the objections of
the critics, 6 between July" and November" of 1956 they produced a new
13. Id. at 68.
14. Braucher, The 1956 Revision of the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 VILL. L. REv.
3,6 (1956).
15. ALI NAT'L CONFERENCE COMM'RS UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1956 REcOMMENDA-
TIONs OF EDITORIAL BOARD, U.C.C. vi-x (1957) [hereinafter cited and referred to as
1956 RECOMMENDATIONS], lists the active draftsmen and committees. A list of the original
draftsmen and committees can be found in ALI NAT'L CONFERENCE COMI'RS UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS, CODE OF COMMERCIAL LAW, fly leaves (1948).
16. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 14, at 5:
The Report disapproves one of the eight major articles of the Code-Article 5: Let-
ters of Credit-but does not otherwise recommend any fundamental change. The
Report also makes specific adverse reference to the drafting or policy of parts of
some 67 of the nearly 400 sections of the Code. However, the problems raised are
not at all insoluble....
The 1956 Recommendations cite changes due to the New York Law Revision Com-
mission in 134 sections while omitting all those used in Article 9. Note 21 infra. But see
Goodrich, 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS vi:
Some of these changes are fairly important. Some are merely alterations in lan-
guage because some group of critics thought that our meaning was not clear. Since
the entire text was under examination anyhow, language changes not highly im-
portant in themselves have been made when some serious critic thought we were
in danger of being misunderstood.
See generally Schnader, 34 ALI PROCEEDINGS 54-55 (1957).
17. Braucher, supra note 14, at 7.
18. Braucher, supra note 3, at 804.
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version of the Code which appeared within a year of the New York Law
Revision Commission's report. The new draft was published in 1957 in a
pamphlet entitled 1956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board of The
Uniform Commercial Code. This sets out the changes in each section
using brackets for portions deleted and italic type for new material. An
examination of this document shows that although it attempts to retain the
same general outline and section numbers, by actual count, it contains
changes in over two-thirds of the 1952 sections.19 These range from slight
variations of expression in some sections to alterations in basic definitions
and replacement of whole sections, articles, and parts of articles. After each
section change, there is a note giving the reason for the revision. With the
exception of the "reasons" in Article 9, which contains the greatest pro-
portional number of changes in sections reworded or entirely replaced, there
is a reference to the organization whose criticism it attempts to meet. Of
those named in the other nine articles, the great majority of references to
the changes are to the New York Law Revision Commission.2" Since the
Commission was also very critical of Article 9,21 it is a fair assumption that
the changes there were also largely motivated by the Commission.
Shortly after the 1956 Recommendations, there was published in 1957
a Uniform Commercial Code, Official Edition, printed without com-
ments22 but in a form almost identical to that suggested by the 1956 Rec-
ommendations. This draft was approved by the Commission on Uniform
Laws and the American Law Institute in its meeting of May 1957 without
any discussion.2" Apparently everybody took it on faith. The new com-
19. The actual percentage of change was 69%, divided as follows: Article 1, Gen-
eral Provisions, 59%; Article 2, Sales, 61%; Article 3, Commercial Paper, 48%; Article
4, Bank Collection, 77%; Article 5, Letters of Credit, 100%; Article 6, Bulk Transfers,
80%; Article 7, Documents of Title, 72%; Article 8, Investment Securities, 80%; Article
9, Secured Transactions, 95%; Article 10, Effective Date and Repealer, 50%. If the
percentage of changes is any indication of lack of quality, Article 3, on Commercial
Paper, was the best drafted.
20. Out of 228 changes where sources of criticism are mentioned 134 (or 59%) re-
fer to the N.Y.L.R.C. by name.
21. N.Y.L.R.C. Report 464-85 (1956) covers twenty-one pages of closely printed
discussion of the 1952 draft and of revisions made by the Editorial Board. The compli-
cated nature of this discussion makes an accurate summary almost impossible but it can
be safely stated that out of over 50 sections in Article 9, the New York Commission ap-
proved only 6. It approved about 30 changes made by the Editorial Board and made
about 70 suggestions for changes.
22. Braucher, supra note 3, at 804.
23. 34 ALI PROCaDa Gs 53-54 (1957).
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ments which were required by the extensive revisions did not appear until
1958 with the publication of the 1957 edition of the Code."
With the approval of the Commission on Uniform State Laws and the
American Law Institute, the initial phases of the drafting came to an end
about fifteen years after the definitive work began. 5
Whether the 1956 Recommendations actually met the criticisms levied
against the 1952 draft by the New York Law Revision Commission and
others is at present a mystery.
The very size of the project and the six volumes of materials supporting
the criticisms by the New York Law Revision Commission make it impos-
sible for a single scholar or the legal staff of even the largest organization
in a short time to make the comparison and the integration necessary to
answer such a question for the entire Code. This will have to be left to
future scholars; but some of the material which follows begins to cast con-
siderable doubt on the sufficiency of the 1956 revision. At any rate, the
1956 Recommendations and the Law Revision Commission's publications
have taken their place in the basic source materials needed to solve the ques-
tions of the legislative intent of the Code and its Comments, not only for
New York but for every state where it has been adopted."
If the Commercial Code is to be uniformly interpreted it is imperative
that a definitive commentary based on these materials be produced at once.
After the second final approval, the work of getting the various states to
adopt the Code, which had been completely stymied by the New York
Law Revision Commission Report, again went into high gear. With the
opponents stalled by the enormity of the task of criticism, probably the most
effective lobby in the history of state legislation pushed for its enactment.
The Code was introduced into the legislatures of Massachusetts, Indiana,
and Pennsylvania in 1957,2' before the revised comments were ready, and
was immediately passed in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky.28
Thereafter in a whirlwind of activity it swept through the legislatures, in-
24. U.C.C., 1957 OFFICIAL TzxT (1958).
25. See Braucher, supra note 3, at 800; cf. 34 ALI PROCEEDINGS 53 (1937). For a
discussion of the sufficiency of the time consumed see Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Corn-
mnreTaL Code as a Problem in Codification, 16 LAw & CONT9MP. PROB. 141, 144 (1951).
26. BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE contains the full text of the
1956 Recommendations, and the New York Consolidated Laws Service, Uniform Com-
mercial Code, in historical notes in its annotations contains references apparently with-
out citations to the New York Law Revision Commission Reports, and citations to the
1956 Recommendations.
27. See Braucher, supra note 3, at 804.
28. Ky. Acts 1958, ch. 77, at 214; Mass. Acts 1957, ch. 765, at 764; Pa. Laws 1959,
Acts 426, 687, at 1023, 1883, amending and revising the original Commercial Code,
Pa. Laws 1953, Act 1.
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cluding New York where it was passed without any further return to or
approval by the Law Revision Commission.29 Today, less than ten years after
final approval, " it has been adopted in fifty-one jurisdictions."' Only Loui-
siana and Puerto Rico and the federal law are still without it. It is being
translated into Spanish for submission in Puerto Rico.2 But because, if en-
acted there, it would cut the Civil Codes of Puerto Rico and Louisiana to
ribbons, it is doubtful if, short of complete law revision, they will ever
adopt it.
Now that, for practical purposes, it is the law of the whole country, dis-
cussion of its draftsmanship has become largely academic. It is time to turn
to problems of interpretation of the Code, and to its effect on the laws of
the jurisdictions which have adopted it.
II. INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION GENERALLY
In classical phraseology, the application of a statute to a particular prob-
lem has been divided into two stages, interpretation and construction."
Although there is no exact scientific division of the two processes, and many
courts and writers use the terminology interchangeably, "' for convenience
it may be said that the two steps are about as follows.
Interpretation usually covers the process of determining the meaning of
the words as they appear in the statute as applied to the problem at hand.
This involves the determination of their plain meaning from dictionary
definition of the words, and from their position in context in the statute
itself. The context also includes technical statutory meanings to be found
29. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 553, at 2580. To be sure, there was a further study
by the New York Commissioners on Uniform Laws which resulted in many more New
York amendments to the 1957 draft. See Penney, New York Revisits the Code: Some
Variations in the New York Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 COLUMn.
L. REv. 992 (1962).
30. The S.A. was adopted in 39 jurisdictions over a period of 56 years, 1 Uni-
form Laws Annotated (Supp. 1966, at 7) [hereinafter cited as U.L.A.]; the W.R.A.,
55 jurisdictions in 54 years, 3 U.L.A. (Supp. 1966, at 9); the B.L.A., 33 jurisdictions in
45 years, 4 U.L.A. (Supp. 1966, at 7); the N.I.L., 55 jurisdictions in 29 years, 5 U.L.A.
(Supp. 1966, at 9); the S.T.A., 52 jurisdictions in 35 years, 6 U.L.A. (Supp. 1966, at
7). When it is considered that each of these acts is comparatively short, the speed
of adoption of the Commercial Code is truly phenomenal. Or is it possible that because
the legislators could not understand it, it was easier to get it adopted?
31. 43 ALI ANNUAL REPORT 16 (1966).
32. 42 ALI PROCEEDINGS 37 (1965).
33. BLACK, THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAws 1-9 (2d ed. 1911);
LMBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS ch. 3 (3d ed. Hammond 1880); 2
SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 365 (2d ed. Lewis 1904).
34. Landis, Statutes and Sources of Law, in HARvARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213, 218 n.13
(1934).
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in definitions made part of the statute. Beyond this, one encounters the
meaning in which the legislature intended to use the terms, which may or
may not be the traditional technical use of the words by the courts and the
legal profession, the purpose for which the statute was enacted, the laws
superseded or changed, the legislative history as shown by debates, and so
forth. In the case of the Commercial Code, due to the intricate draftsman-
ship and the complicated history, this now includes the earlier drafts and
their comments, the New York Law Revision Commission Reports, the
1956 Recommendations, and the current Comments." Beyond this, the
later judicial interpretations of the words of the Code 6 and the law af-
fected by it "7 are already accumulating, and these are by no means uni-
form. It should also be noted that these various methods of interpretation
can, and usually do, reach different results in the same or similar cases.
In this country at least, there appears to be no fixed order of precedence
which the courts or the profession are required to give these various types of
interpretation. Which one prevails seems to be determined by the equity of
the case, the equities of the statute," the reason or logic of its application to
35. Comments were clearly proper as part of the interpretation of the older uniform
laws. See BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAiW 94 (7th ed. Beutel 1948). With
respect to the U.C.C. see 1 N.Y.L.R.C. Study 156-63 (1955); 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS
2-3; Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1966
Wis. L. REV. 597.
36. See, e.g., Charles Martin Distrib. Co. v. Banks, 111 Ga. App. 538, 142 S.E.
2d 309 (1965). A word of warning is necessary here that many decisions in Pennsylvania
are based on the 1953 statute, which was amended, Pa. Laws 1959, Acts 426, 687,
at 1023, 1883, amending and revising Pa. Laws 1953, Act 1, to correspond with the
1956 Recommendations, so that their interpretations are based on words no longer in
the U.C.C. Compare, e.g., Grange Nat'l Bank v. Conville, 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 616, 5 Lyc.
170 (C.P. 1956) (liability of the principal), with U.C.C. § 3-307 (1)(b). Compare
Perfect's Market, Inc. v. Serro, 42 Westm. 35 (Pa. C.P. 1959), with U.C.C. §§ 3-302
(I)(b); 1-201 (19); 2-103 (1)(b). There are also cases based on local variations in
wording of the U.C.C. which are contrary to the uniform version. See United Sec. Corp.
v. Bruton, 213 A.2d 892 (D.C. Ct. App. 1965) (discussed in note 73 infra). The cases are
now being compiled in BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE; WILLIER &
HART, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REPORTER-DIGEST; and FISCHER & WILLS, UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE REPORTING SERVICE.
37. Compare Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 238 Ark. 534, 383 S.W.2d 885 (1964);
Epstein v. Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (C.P. 1963); Lorzrick
v. Republic Steel Corp., I Ohio App. 2d 374, 205 N.E.2d 92 (1965), aff'd, 6 Ohio St. 2d
227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966); and Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Co., 414 Pa. 272, 199 A.2d
463 (1964), with Berry v. American Cyanamid Co., 341 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1965); Miller
v. Preitz, 221 A.2d 320 (Pa. 1966); and Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610,
187 A.2d 575 (1963).
38. See Landis, supra note 34, at 214-22.
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the particular facts, the interests of the lawyers, their clients, or the litigants,
or simply the caprice of the court. 9
Construction seems to be the second step in the application of the statute.
After its meaning has been determined by the proper interpretation, the
question arises as to the effect on the whole body of the law. Should it be
construed in such a manner as to control the facts of the case at hand?
Over fifty years before the uniform statutes had made any appreciable im-
print upon the body of the laws of this country, Dean Pound discussed
statutory construction as follows:
Four ways may be conceived of in which courts in such a legal sys-
tem as ours might deal with a legislative innovation. (1) They might
receive it fully into the body of the law as affording not only a rule to
be applied but a principle from which to reason, and hold it, as a later
and more direct expression of the general will, of superior authority to
judge-made rules on the same general subject; and so reason from it
by analogy in preference to them. (2) They might receive it fully into
the body of the law to be reasoned from by analogy the same as any
other rule of law, regarding it, however, as of equal or co-ordinate au-
thority in this respect with judge-made rules upon the same general
subject. (3) They might refuse to receive it fully into the body of the
law and give effect to it directly only; refusing to reason from it by
analogy but giving it, nevertheless, a liberal interpretation to cover the
whole field it was intended to cover. (4) They might not only refuse
to reason from it by analogy and apply it directly only, but also give to
it a strict and narrow interpretation, holding it down rigidly to those
cases which it covers expressly. The fourth hypothesis represents the
orthodox common law attitude toward legislative innovations. Prob-
ably the third hypothesis, however, represents more nearly the attitude
toward which we are tending. The second and first hypotheses doubt-
less appeal to the common law lawyer as absurd. He can hardly con-
ceive that a rule of statutory origin may be treated as a permanent
part of the general body of the law. But it is submitted that the course
of legal development upon which we have entered already must lead
us to adopt the method of the second and eventually the method of the
first hypothesis."
The first step recommended by Dean Pound will be recognized at once
as the standard method of construing codes in civil law jurisdictions,"'
39. It should be noted here that court decisions under a system of uniform laws lose
much of their authority. For this development under the N.I.L. see BRANNAN, op. Cit.
supra note 35, at 101-09 & nn.82-104.
40. Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REv. 383, 385-86 (1908).
41. See CoDE CIvIL arts. 4, 5 (Fr. 63d ed. Dalloz 1964) (prohibits judges from follow-
ing previous cases); 1 LACONTINERIE, TRAITE DROIT CIVIL DES PERSONNES 237,
264 bis-XIII (3d ed. 1907); PLANIOL ET R IPPERT, TRArTE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL
§§ 221-22 (1928); SCHUSTER, PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN CIVIL LAW 10-13 (1907).
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where the codes are recognized as part of the body of the law itself. In
common law countries the progress in this direction has been much slower.42
But in the case of the uniform laws, there was considerable progress along
these lines before the adoption of the Commercial Code."'
In addition to the question to which the four propositions stated by
Pound are directed, there is now, in this country, a fifth question involving
the construction which should be given to one general statute which im-
pinges upon or limits a portion of another in the same field, which by the
proper interpretation of both, was clearly not intended to be repealed. Be-
cause of its broad scope of subject matter, this fifth problem becomes espe-
cially pertinent when dealing with the construction of the Commercial
Code.
There are, of course, the familiar rules of statutory interpretation. There
is, for example, the familiar rule that statutes which apparently conflict
should be so interpreted as to give effect to each." Then there is the further
rule of construction that, in case of conflict, the specific controls the gen-
eral," or the later repeals the earlier."
To this, there might be added a rule that in areas beyond the plain mean-
ing of both, a code statute should be extended by construction (Pound's
first and second propositions) whereas a particular statute should not be so
extended, or might even be narrowly construed to prevent possible conflict
(Pound's fourth category). Here again the choice of action by one apply-
ing the statute is so great as to allow him to apply at his caprice the well
established and cited rule he desires as an excuse for his conclusion. In the
case of the Code, this difficulty is further compounded by the controversy
over whether the Commercial Code is really a unified general statute em-
bodying a whole area of the law and repealing others in the field or whether
it is a mere collection of specific statutes.
Ill. Is THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REALLY A CODE?
It is not necessary here to go into the argument on the merits of general
codification in which the body of the law is reduced to writing in broad
consistent principles, as against the enactment of numerous narrow, spe-
42. See Landis, supra note 34.
43. See BRANNAN, Op. cit. supra note 35, at 98-101.
44. BLACK, op. cit. supra note 33, at 325, 345, 352 (2d ed. 1911); MAXWELL, INTER-
PRETATION OF STATUTES 32 (11th ed. Wilson & Galpin 1962); SEDGwXcK, INTERPRETA-
TION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 97-116 (2d ed.
Pomeroy 1874).
45. CRAIES, STATUTE LAW 321 (4th ed. Scott 1936).
46. BLACK, op. cit, supra note 33, at 353; SEDOWICK, op. cit. supra note 44, at 96.
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cific, and independent statutes directed at particular situations leaving
large portions of the resulting regulation to unwritten law. The Code is
an accomplished fact but its nature will have a definite effect on the prob-
lems of its interpretation and its application to business situations.
If classification is helpful, then it must be said that the Commercial Code
in spite of its name and intent, expressed in a number of sections,48 is not a
code in the same sense as the French or German Civil Codes, the French
Commercial Code, the Louisiana Civil Code, the Field Codes, or the Geor-
gia or California codes."' In spite of much improvement and correlation
in the 1956 Recommendations, it still remains as in its earlier drafts0 a col-
lection of specific statutes with their own often uncorrelated specific 1 and
conflicting 2 definitions and theories."
In many instances these statutes are still narrower in scope, subject matter,
and language than were the uniform laws which they repeal. 4 It is fair to
47. For a discussion of this problem in relation to the Commercial Code see
1 N.Y.L.R.C. Study 37 (1955).
48. U.C.C. §§ 1-102(1) comment 1; 1-104; 1-106, comment 1; 3-104; 3-805, com-
ment; 8-101; comment; 9-101, comment; 1 N.Y.L.R.C. Study 63 (1955); see U.C.C.
§ 1-203, comment.
49. Farnsworth, A General Survey of Article 3 and an Examination of Two Aspects
of Codification, 44 TEXAS L. Rav. 645, 656 (1966); Smith, The First Codification of
the Substantive Common Law, 4 TUL. L. REv. 178 (1930).
50. 1 N.Y.L.R.C. Study 125 (1955); see Beutel, supra note 4, at 348; Beutel, supra
note 25, at 158.
51. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201 (first paragraph), 2-103, 3-102, 4-104, 5-103, 7-102,
8-102, 9-105, 9-109. Numerous additional definitions are embodied in separate ar-
ticles. E.g., U.C.C. §§ 3-204, 3-416.
52. For example, "value" still has at least three meanings which may apply to
the same transaction, as for example the transfer for credit of a draft or note with
bills of lading or securities attached, U.C.C. §§ 1-201(44) (a), 3-303, 4-208(1)(b),
4-209, and duly negotiated "in settlement or payment of a money obligation," U.C.C.
§ 7-501(4). "Notice" has a variation of meanings which would require a treatise to
correlate, distinguish and explain. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-201(25), (26), (27); 2-104(3);
2-201(2); 2-315; 2-616(2); (3), (5); 3-206(4); 3-304; 3-415(4); 3-508; 4-203;
4-205(2); 4-303; 6-107 7-501(6); 8-305; 8-310; 9-307; 9-308; 9-309. "Documentary
draft has at least two meanings. Compare U.C.C. §2 4-104(1)(f), and 5-103(1)(b),
with U.C.C. §§ 3-104(3), and 3-105(1)(d).
53. A different type of law for "merchants" seems to belong to Article 2 only. U.C.C.
§ 2-104, comment 2. The treatment of the concept of "holder in due course," "bona
fide purchaser," and the like is almost as various as it was in the earlier drafts. See Beutel,
supra note 4, at 341-42. There are likewise varying types and theories of negotiability,
see U.C.C. §§ 3-305, 5-114, 7-502, 8-201(2), 8-202, 9-206, all of which are chopped
up by Article 4. Article 9, except for a trick definition of "debtor," U.C.C. § 9-
105(1) (d), contains little reference to the rights and duties inter se of assignor and
assignee of security agreements. The right to call in third parties who are ultimately
liable, and the right to interpleader, which should be general, are found in specific ar-
ticles like U.C.C. §§ 2-607(5), 3-803, 7-603. Careful study will reveal many more.
54. One of the most startling examples of this change is found in Article 3, which
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say that, in some of its parts it partakes of the nature of a general law, in
others only a collection of special statutes.
A complete enumeration, classification, and integration of the articles and
sections of the Code will have to be left to a later definitive treatise which
in volume alone would be required to be at least three times as large as
Williston on Sales."5 Thereafter there still remains the task of using the Code.
to solve particular cases. In this effort it is not at all surprising to find the
courts tangled in the intricacies of particular Code sections, ignoring techni-
cal interpretation and resorting to the idea of justice and fairness to decide
the problems at hand." This is the type of raw rural justice which hardly
abandons the attempt to the N.I.L. to codify the entire law of negotiability. See Crocker
Nat'l Bank v. Byrne & McDonnell, 178 Cal. 329, 173 Pac. 752 (1918); Kohn v. Sacra-
mento Elec., Gas & Ry., 168 Cal. 1, 141 Pac. 626 (1914); King Cattle Co. v. Joseph,
158 Minn. 481, 198 N.W. 798 (1924) (and cases cited therein); President & Directors of
Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 24 N.Y. 38, 150 N.E. 594 (1926); Manker v. American
Say. & Trust Co., 131 Wash. 430, 230 Pac. 406 (1924). Article 3 retreats to the form of
the British Bill of Exchange Act, 45 & 46 Vict. article 3, c. 61 (1882), which covers only
checks, drafts, and promissory notes see U.C.C. § 3-103, comment 1, thus leaving vast
areas of the law of negotiable instruments, in addition to those areas treated by Articles
4, 5, 7, 8, and 9, entirely uncovered.
U.C.C. § 3-415 omits the provisions of N.I.L. § 64, which it replaces, as to pre-
sumed order of liability of anomalous indorsers. See U.C.C. § 3-415, comment 4.
There are also U.C.C. §§ 2-403(2), (3) which replace S.A. § 25 on sale and reten-
tion of possession. It covers only goods entrusted to "merchants"; as to non-merchants the
section is silent. Section 2-401 (2) helps only when there is no specific agreement as to
title. COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UCO § 1803
(1)(c) (1966); see Weisel v. McBride, 191 Pa. Super. 411, 156 A.2d 613 (1959)
(overlooking U.C.C. § 9-201). U.C.C. § 3-307 as indicated by the following material
is much narrower than N.I.L. § 59 as to presumptions of holding in due course. Many
other examples can easily be found.
Much of the balance of this paper will develop some of the problems raised by this
type of narrow wording.
55. The latest edition (1948) is in four volumes. An idea of the size and nature of
such a treatise can be had from the following: AUBRY & RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS,
(6th ed. 1938) (12 volumes); BANDRY-LACONTINERIE, DROIT CIVIL (1896) (26 vol-
umes); MARCADE, EXPLICATION DU CODE NAPOLEON (1865) (six volumes); PAUL PONT,
EXPLICATION DU CODE NAPOLEON (1868) (11 volumes).
56. Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966), is
such a case. In this case the defendant, an auto dealer, sold a car to a customer for a
note and conditional sales contract which the defendant immediately discounted with
the plaintiff bank, and contracted on a separate printed form furnished by the bank to
repurchase the contract on default, for the amount due thereon, waiving any notice of
default or foreclosure sale. After two installments, the customer defaulted, the bank
repossessed the car, and, without notifying the defendant and contrary to its practice
in previous cases, sold it at private sale for seventy-five dollars. The bank sued defend-
ant for $277.88, the unpaid balance.
In this simple $300 case we see the interpretation of the Code at work. The lower
court gave judgment for the bank and the defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of
Arkansas asked for and received the services of the Permanent Editorial Board of the
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meets the sophisticated technique which the Code requires. However, it
might be useful here to illustrate the types of problems of interpretation and
construction which a definitive treatise on the Code would entail.
IV. THE PRESUM.PTION OF HOLDING IN
DUE COURSE IN SUITS UNDER ARTICLE 3
One of the most useful provisions in the old law was the presumption in
favor of holders. The Negotiable Instruments Law stated the rule as fol-
lows, "Every holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due course." '
This section as so broadly worded applies to all the various situations where
a holder is involved both in court and out. While many writers have dis-
cussed it only as it applies to law suits on negotiable instruments8 it is clear
that it has application to many other instances. For example, a person pur-
chasing an instrument could assume that the seller was a holder in due
course and he did not have to inquire as to the vendor's rights."0 Even if he
was negligent by not so inquiring, the presumption was still in his favor.6 0
Code in the form of two amici briefs which held that the defendant was not a debtor
within U.C.C. § 9-504(3) and not entitled to notice of the sales, but reached the result
that would follow if he were and awarded him damages under U.C.C. § 9-507(1). The
amici briefs differed on the amount of damages. The court found that the defendant was
a "debtor," presumably within but not citing U.C.C. § 9-105(d), that the rules for con-
sumers goods in U.C.C. § 9-507(1) did not apply; but reserved judgment on the point.
It decided, "In simple fairness he should have had notice," 240 Ark. at -, 398 S.W.2d
at 541, and, "Upon the issue of damages simple considerations of fair play cast the bur-
den of proof upon the bank," 240 Ark. at-, 398 S.W.2d at 542. Judgment was reversed
and the case was remanded for a new trial. So, after expending far more than the
amount involved, the case is ready to start again, to begin the process of applying the
Code.
So the interpretation of the Code goes out the window. If one is interested in inter-
pretation he may consult U.C.C. §§ 9-504(3); 9-207(1), comment 1; 9-105(1) (a), (c),
(d), (h), (i); 9-501(3) (b); 9-318(1) (a), (b); 9-507(1); 9-109(1), (4); 1-107; 1-201
(46). Compare U.C.C. §§ 2-202; 1-205(4); and 1-201(3), with U.C.C. §§ 2-208(1);
3-112(1) (e); and 1-203, and their comments. There may be others, but at any rate all
the conclusions worked out by the persons interested in the principal case can find sup-
port here, and perhaps a few more. The ultimate result will depend upon how far one
reads, and how much weight he places upon, general sections in aid of interpretation of
specific sections. Was the court right in deciding it was a matter of "simple fairness"?
If it was, "what price" Commercial Code in this case?
57. The entire text of N.I.L. § 59 was as follows:
Who Deemed Holder in Due Course. Every holder is deemed prima facie to be
a holder in due course; but when it is shown that the title of any person who has
negotiated the instrument was defective, the burden is on the holder to prove that
he or some person under whom he claims acquired the title as holder in due course.
But the last-mentioned rule does not apply in favor of a party who became bound
on the instrument prior to the acquisition of such defective title.
58. See BRrrON, BILLS & NOTES § 102 (2d ed. 1961) (and authorities there cited).
59. See cases cited BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 35, at 788.
60. See cases cited id. at 772-79.
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The provision could also be used to settle the conflict over the question of
whether the first indorsee of an instrument indorsed in trust could be a
holder in due course, 1 or whether the payee could be a holder in due
course. 2 The rule also applied to negotiable corporate bonds,8" and by broad
construction to stocks" and documents of title."5
The Commercial Code sections which seem to replace N.I.L. section 59
are sections 3-307 and 8-105.8 Both of these sections are much narrower
in their wording than was section 59 of the N.I.L. Section 3-307(2) pro-
vides "when signatures are admitted or established, production of the instru-
ment entitles the holder to recover on it unless the defendant establishes a de-
fense."8" Section 8-105(2) (c) has the same wording but adds the words
"or defect going to the validity of the security.""8
61. See discussion and conflicting cases id. at § 37.
62. See discussion and conflicting cases id. at § 52. It might also be useful in apply-
ing N.I.L. § 66 (first clause) to warranty cases.
63. Paxton v. Miller, 102 Ind. App. 511, 200 N.E. 87 (1936); Parks v. Hughes, 145
La. 221, 82 So. 202 (1919); Gruntal v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 254
N.Y. 468, 173 N.E. 682 (1930); Scott v. Platt, 171 Ore. 379, 135 P.2d 769 (1943).
64. Welland Investment Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 81 N.J. Super. 180, 195 A.2d 210
(Ch. 1963); 1 CooK, CORPORATIONS § 13 (8th ed. 1923); see Morrison v. Liberty
Discount & Say. Bank, 61 Lack. Jur. 37 (Pa. C.P. 1958).
65. See authorities cited notes 144-47 infra.
66. U.C.C. Table of Sections of Prior Uniform Acts, p. xxxvi, cites N.I.L. § 59 as
replaced by U.C.C. §§ 3-207, 3-306, and 8-301. Sections 3-307 and 8-105(2)(c),
(d) (which is not cited at all-an obvious oversight) seem to have direct bearing on
the presumption and the others only marginal effect.
67. The entire section reads:
Section 3-307. Burden of Establishing Signatures, Defenses and Due Course.
(1) Unless specifically denied in the pleadings each signature on an instru-
ment is admitted. When the effectiveness of a signature is put in issue
(a) the burden of establishing it is on the party claiming under the
signature; but
(b) the signature is presumed to be genuine or authorized except where
the action is to enforce the obligation of a purported signer who
has died or become incompetent before proof is required.
(2) When signatures are admitted or established, production of the instru-
ment entities a holder to recover on it unless the defendant establishes a defense.
(3) After it is shown that a defense exists a person claiming the rights of a
holder in due course has the burden of establishing that he or some person un-
der whom he claims is in all respects a holder in due course.
68. The entire section reads:
Section 8-105. Securities Negotiable; Presumptions.
(1) Securities governed by this Article are negotiable instruments.
(2) In any action on a security
(a) unless Epecifically denied in the pleadings, each signature on the
security or in a necessary indorsement is admitted;
(b) when the effectiveness of a signature is put in issue the burden
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A. In Suits on the Instrument
In cases involving a suit on the instrument by a holder against the maker,
the Code sections are clear. When signatures are established, either under
subsection 1 or by evidence, the holder is entitled to recover." This gets the
same result as the N.I.L.; but the facts necessary thereafter to shift the bur-
den of proof are different. Under N.I.L. section 59:
"When it is shown that the title of any person who has negotiated the
instrument is defective, the burden is on the holder to prove that he or
some person under whom he claims acquired the title in due
course ....
The Code's section 3-307(3) uses a different test. It provides:
"After it is shown that a defense exists a person claiming the rights of
a holder in due course has the burden of establishing that he or some
person under whom he claims is in all respects a holder in due course."
Note that "defective title" has been changed to "defense exists." This gets
substantially different results than did N.I.L. section 59.
Under the N.I.L., a defective title depended upon the action and state of
mind of a person negotiating the instrument. Section 55 of the N.I.L. says
that a title is defective:
"When he obtained the instrument, or any signature thereto, by fraud,
duress, or force and fear, or other unlawful means, or for an illegal
consideration, or when he negotiates it in breach of faith, or under
such circumstances as amount to a fraud."
It should be apparent at once that although the test of defective title in-
cluded many defenses, it did not cover the defenses of absence of considera-
tion, failure of consideration, accommodation, part payment, or accord and
satisfaction. These defenses would be a basis for defects of title only if the
holder against whom they were effective negotiated the instrument after
they arose "in breach of faith, or under such circumstances as amount[ed]
to a fraud." Generally, under the N.I.L. all defenses of the maker arising
of establishing it is on the party claiming under the signature but
the signature is presumed to be genuine or authorized;
(c) when signatures are admitted or established production of the in-
strument entitles a holder to recover on it unless the defendant
establishes a defense or a defect going to the validity of the secur-
ity; and
(d) after it is shown that a defense or defect exists the plaintiff has
the burden of establishing that he or some person under whom he
claims is a person against whom the defense or defect is ineffective.
69. Watertown Say. & Loan v. Spanks, 346 Mass. 398, 193 N.E.2d 333 (1963).
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after negotiation of the instrument to the holder,7 and some not known to
the transferor at the time of negotiation, did not shift the burden of proof.
The presumption still acted in the holder's favor.71
Although the comments do not indicate any change, the effect of the
Code's section 3-307(3) in this respect is quite different. It says, "After it is
shown that a defense exists" then the burden shifts to the holder.71 Obvi-
ously, this means any defense existing at the time of the trial and completely
eliminates all the exceptions in the N.I.L. applying to defenses arising after
negotiation of the paper. The case of United Sec. Corp. v. Bruton73 has
already reached this result where the defense arose after negotiation to the
plaintiff. This repeals the authority of hundreds of cases decided under the
N.I.L.7' and will have a marked effect upon the pleading and practice in
all states.
There are further questions raised by the phraseology of section
3-307 (3). First it says, "after it is shown that a defense exists." This would,
in its broadest meaning, cover any defense to the instrument whether apply-
ing to the defendant or another person not a party to the instant case, such
as a co-maker or indorser with the defense of fraud, non-delivery, or the
like. Under the last sentence of N.I.L. section 59 it was clear that in such
a case the burden did not shift and the holder was entitled to recover if the
defendant had become "bound on the instrument prior to the acquisition
of such defective title." In such a case, a person liable could pay the
holder relying on the presumption that he was a holder in due course
and such payment would be payment in due course under N.I.L. sec-
tion 88." Consequently, there was no necessity for the holder to prove
70. See N.I.L. § 59 (last sentence), set out in note 57 supra.
71. See cases cited BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 35, at 882-84.
72. Budget Charge Accounts v. Mullaney, 187 Pa. Super. 190, 144 A.2d 438 (1958)
(1952 edition of Code); First Pa. Banking & Trust Co. v. DeLise, 186 Pa. Super. 53,
195 A.2d 115 (1958) (1952 edition of Code); see 2 N.Y.L.R.C. Study 976 (1955);
1 N.Y.L.R.C. Hearings 207, 247, 426, 544, 976 (1954). Under the 1952 edi-
tion of the Code it was sufficient to raise the defense without proving it, 2 N.Y.L.R.C.
Study 975 (1955); 10 MERCER L. REV. 211 (1958), but the 1956 Recommendations
returned to the rule of the N.I.L. requiring the defense to be proved before the burden
shifted, see 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS 107.
73. 213 A.2d 892 (D.C. Ct. App. 1965). Although, as the court points out, the
cause of action arose before the Code became effective in the District of Columbia, the
trial occurred after the effective date. The D.C. edition of the Code, D.C. CODE § 28:
10-102 (Supp. 1965), does not contain the provisions of U.C.C. § 10-102(2), so the
court properly decided that the procedural matter involved was determined by the law at
the time of the trial.
74. See cases cited BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 35, at 882-84.
75. Payment is made in due course when it is made at or after the maturity of the
instrument to the holder thereof in good faith and without notice that his title is defec-
tive. N.I.L. § 88.
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that he was a holder in due course. The defendant, with no defense of his
own, having paid without notice of a defect in the holder's title, would be
discharged. The Code has abolished payment in due course,"' giving any
party the right to discharge if he pays a holder even with knowledge of
adverse claims (except for two exceptions not important here which will be
discussed later) unless the third party affirmatively intervenes. It further
provides in section 3-306(d) :
The claim of any third person to the instrument is not otherwise
available as a defense to any party liable thereon unless the third per-
son himself defends the action for such party.
Now, although they are not defined in Article 3," it is clear that technically
a claim is not a defense,"' so it may be said that the Code is silent on the
question of whether or not proof of such a defense by a third party shifts the
burden. But as a practical matter, claims and defenses often arise from the
same facts, so when the sections are read together it seems that "a defense
exists" ought to be interpreted as when "the defendant in this suit proves
he has a defense." This gives section 3-307 a narrow interpretation limit-
ing it to law suits only. That this was probably the intention of the framers
is shown by the fact that they think that section 3-306(d) takes the place
of the last sentence of N.I.L. section 59.7O
It also should be observed here, in passing, that under the Code when an
instrument is acquired through a thief or a restrictive indorsement, this
becomes a defense to prior parties.8" So if these facts are "shown" the bur-
den will shift to the holder to show that he is a holder in due course. Per-
haps until these matters are better settled, lawyers might do well to
act as if the proof of a defense by anybody shifts the burden.
There is a second difficulty of interpretation which requires further ex-
amination.
After it is shown that a defense exists a person claiming the rights of a
holder in due course has the burden of establishing that he or some
person under whom he claims is in all respects a holder in due
course.
8
'
76. U.C.C. § 3-603, comment.
77. The U.C.C. defines "adverse claim" to include "a claim that a transfer was or
would be wrongful or that a particular adverse person is the owner of or has an interest
in the security." U.C.C. § 8-301(1).
78. "Claim" and "defense" are widely used throughout the U.C.C. See, e.g., U.C.C.§§ 3-305(1), (2); 3-306(a), (b).
79. See U.C.C. § 3-306, comment 5. See also U.C.C. § 3-304, comment 4.
80. U.C.C. § 3-306(d); 3-306(a), (b), comments.
81. U.C.C. § 3-307(3). (Emphasis added.) See generally Korzenik v. Supreme
Radio, 347 Mass. 108, 197 N.E.2d 702 (1964).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1966/iss4/1
COMMERCIAL CODE: HOLDING IN DUE COURSE
Literally interpreted, the words italicized would require the holder to show
that he was a holder in due course not only as to the defense offered but in
every other respect. This literal interpretation is supported by the comment
to section 3-307(3),82 which states that: " 'in all respects' means that he
must sustain this burden by affirmative proof that the instrument was taken
for value, that it was taken in good faith and that it was taken without
notice." ' Since these are all the requirements of holding in due course set
out in section 3-302, it seems that the draftsmen meant exactly what they
said, and any holder who could not prove that he, or some person under
whom he claims, was completely a holder in due course, would take as a
mere assignee subject to most defenses which could be "shown," whether
he knew of them or not at the time he purchased.
This leads to some interesting and important results as to the facts in sub-
stantive law which the holder is required to prove. Examples of a few will
suffice:
(1) The defendant shows that he has a defense of failure of considera-
tion."" The instrument in question "bears ... visible evidence of forgery or
alteration,"' 5 in the form of changed words or figures. Can the holder show
that in fact the changes were authorized, and that he knew it when he took
the instrument? And, therefore, is he a holder in due course as to the failure
of consideration? The answer is no. Section 3-304(1) says, "The purchaser
has notice of a claim or defense" in these facts, so he did not take it "with-
out notice .. .of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any per-
son;"' so he cannot meet the burden of proof that he is other than an
assignee.
(2) The defendant shows that he was induced to sign by fraud. The
holder took the paper from a known fiduciary to pay the fiduciary's own
82. U.C.C. § 3-307, comment 3.
83. Norman v. World Wide Distribs., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963)
(good faith). This requirement without notice raises the old and interesting question
of proof of a negative; but this paper is already too complicated to go into such ques-
tions.
84. U.C.C. § 3-408.
85. U.C.C. § 3-304(1) (a).
86. U.C.C. § 3-302(1) (c). U.C.C. § 3-304, comment 4, would seem to indicate that
the draftsmen do not adopt this kind of interpretation, but this comment contradicts
the plain meaning of the last phrase in U.C.C. § 3-302(1) (c): "on the part of any
person." The last phrase of U.C.C. § 3-307(3) is also in support of this statement. See
Abercrombie Estate, 20 Pa. D. & C.2d 496 (1959).
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debt to the holder, but in good faith on evidence that the fiduciary was
authorized to do so. The fact that this was not true is now shown. By ex-
press provision of the Code, "the purchaser has notice of a claim"8 against
the instrument so he cannot meet the burden of proof. He is therefore a
mere assignee.
(3) Accommodation parties have many defenses against negotiable pa-
per.8" A maker shows that he is an accommodation maker and has a de-
fense of breach of contract, not an accommodation defense. To meet the
burden of proof, the holder shows that he bought without knowledge of the
accommodation and proves that he is otherwise a holder in due course. In
this situation, the holder recovers.89 But if the defendant was an anomalous
indorser, section 3-415 says, "An indorsement which shows that it is not in
the chain of title is notice of its accommodation character,"8 " and accommo-
dation can be a defense; ergo, the holder cannot prove that he is in all
respects a holder in due course and so it would seem he cannot recover.
However, section 3-304 provides that knowledge of the fact "that any
party has signed for accommodation ...does not of itself give the pur-
chaser notice of a defense or claim." 1 How can these two sections be
reconciled? Easily, if the chain of title is regular, and the taker knows of
the accommodation, he is not charged with notice; but if the accommoda-
tion, whether it exists or not, is shown by an anomalous indorsement,
he has legal notice and is a mere assignee. If the defense arises from the
agreement of the accommodation, the reader can work it out for himself.
(4) One more example; suppose the plaintiff holds under a chain of title
containing a restrictive indorsement.92 Now it must be noted that under the
Code "restrictive indorsement" is a different term than it was under the
N.I.L.9' It includes all types of indorsements which were restrictive under
the N.I.L. and, in addition, covers what were previously conditional indorse-
ments. While under the N.I.L., parties liable could disregard conditional
indorsements and pay the instrument according to its tenor before the con-
ditional indorsement,94 under the Code prior parties are bound to perform
87. U.C.C. § 3-304(2).
88. U.C.C. §§ 3-601(2), 3-604(2), 3-606(1). See Rose v. Homsey, 347 Mass. 259,
263, 197 N.E.2d 603, 606 (1964).
89. U.C.C. § 3.415(3).
90. U.C.C. § 3-415(4).
91. U.C.C. § 3-304(4) (c).
92. U.C.C. §§ 3-205, 3-206. These were not in the 1952 draft but were returned
by the 1956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board for the U.C.C., after much criticism.
1956 R COMBIENDATIONS 99-101. See N.Y.L.R.C. Report 404 (1956).
93. Compare N.I.L. §§ 36, 39, with U.C.C. § 3-205.
94. N.I.L. § 39.
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according to the terms of the restrictive indorsement,9" be they conditional
or otherwise. Any restrictive indorsement, therefore, raises a defense by
prior parties. This being so, the burden of proving he is a holder in due
course shifts to the plaintiff. Now what must he prove? If he be a first
taker under the restrictive indorsement he will have to show that he acted
" 'consistent[ly] with the terms' of the indorsement."9 6 If he is a later
holder, he is "neither given notice nor otherwise affected by such restrictive
indorsement unless he has knowledge that a fiduciary or other person has
negotiated the instrument in any transaction for his own benefit or other-
wise in breach of duty." '97 The Code here cites section 3-304(2), which
charges the purchaser with such notice of a claim whether or not the in-
strument is restrictively indorsed.9" So, unlike the anomalous indorsement
which carries notice whether or not it is read, the restrictive indorsement
seems to carry no notice to anybody; 9 but the first indorsee and prior
parties are still bound to its terms whether or not they know of them.'
When the prior party's defense rests on facts outside the scope of the re-
strictive indorsement, it seems that all but possibly a depository or inter-
mediate indorsee bank can prove lack of notice'.. so as to give them in all
respects the rights of a holder in due course. The results would seem to
be contrary to those in the previous examples, and also contrary to those
under the N.I.L.' °' Why? Because the plain words of the Code say so, and
no other interpretation seems possible. It should be clear that these results
follow in any suit on the instrument whether the defendant be a maker or
subsequent party.'
95. U.C.C. § 3-603(1)(b).
96. U.C.C. § 3-206, comment 6. U.C.C. § 3-206(4) does not say so. It says he
"must pay or apply any value given by him .... ." The result of the comment can be
reached by applying U.C.C. § 3-303 (a), which contemplates later performance as "taking
for value."
97. U.C.C. § 3-206(4).
98. Here again the holder has the burden of proving a negative. So normally the
plaintiff should allege and prove such facts (facts which are entirely beyond his knowl-
edge), or he may have to be content with alleging them and letting the holder disprove
them.
99. Quaers about a negative inference from U.C.C. § 3-206(2) (as to depository or
intermediate indorsee banks).
100. U.C.C. §§ 3-603(1)(b), 3-206 (by negative inference). This may result in
situations where a person bound on an instrument is required to pay twice under a
restrictive indorsement under conditions over which he has no control; once to a holder
in due course and again to the beneficiary of a restrictive indorsement.
101. See U.C.C. §§ 3-603(l)(b), 3-307(3), 3-206(2) (negative inference).
102. See BRANNAN, NEGOTUAELE INSTRUMENTS LAw 614-21 (7th ed. Beutel 1948)
(and cases there cited).
103. U.C.C. §§ 3-601 to -606 make no distinction between makers and other parties as
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B. The Operation of the Presumptions and the
Shifting Burden of Proof Under the Code
Whatever may have been the state of the law under previous cases, the
Code seems to offer a clear set of rules so far as the presumptions and bur-
dens of proof where suits on an instrument are concerned. As for the instru-
ment itself, it is clear under section 3-307 (1) that there is a presumption of
the genuineness of its signatures. The Code by definition requires the triers
of fact to find the existence of the fact presumed unless and until evidence
is introduced which will support a finding of its nonexistence.0 4
As to the rest of the instrument beyond the signatures, the presumptions
under the Code are few. Under section 3-114(3), the date is presumed to
be correct, and by section 3-115 (2), the burden of establishing that a com-
pletion is unauthorized is on the party so asserting. By illogical negative
inference it might be argued that there was a presumption of proper com-
pletion. There is also in section 3-201 (3) a statement that mere possession
of an instrument by one not a holder carries no presumption of ownership,
again another possible negative inference as to holders. These are merely
fragmentary presumptions. There seems to be no section corresponding to
the first clause of N.I.L. section 59, which says, "Every holder is deemed
prima facie to be a holder in due course." This not only takes care of the
presumption of holding in due course, but as such lends a presumption of
recovery on all the terms of the instrument. The draftsmen of the Code
substituted for this05 section 3-307(2): "When signatures are admitted
or established, production of the instrument entitles a holder to recover on
it unless the defendant establishes a defense." As will be discussed later,
this is a much narrower provision than the first clause of N.I.L. section 59,
but for the question now under discussion of recovery on the instrument, it
gets the same results. Thus the production of the instrument entitles the
holder without more to recover unless the defendant establishes its invalidity
or another defense. Defenses are of two kinds, those good against the
far as discharges are concerned. It is fair to assume that the same principle applies to
other defenses.
So far as suits on warranties are concerned, unlike the N.I.L. in which there was a
presumption in favor of the holder (see note 62 supra), the Code is silent, and §
3-307 would have no effect except when the suit involved forgery or other lack of
genuineness. Here, of course, by analogy and by ordinary rules of proof, the burden
would seem to be on the plaintiff to prove the forgery or other lack of genuineness.
104. U.C.C. § 1-201(31).
105. U.C.C. § 3-307, comment 2.
106. U.C.C. § 3-307(2).
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holder in due course"' and those not."' Therefore, when it is shown that a
defense of the latter type exists, the burden of establishing that he is a holder
in due course falls upon the holder." 9 The comment to section 3-307 and
the legislative history make it clear that the defendant must establish by the
preponderance of evidence that a defense exists. This preserves the rule un-
der N.I.L. section 59."' If the defendant offers evidence of such a defense,
the sufficiency of such evidence to establish a defense is for the trier of facts.
If the holder offers no evidence, it is still possible for the verdict to be for
either party. The holder may rebut the defense and still win;... but if, in
the opinion of the trier of facts, the evidence is sufficient to support a de-
fense, then the burden shifts to the holder to establish that he is a holder in
due course. "Burden of establishing" is defined as "the burden of persuad-
ing the triers of fact that the existence of the fact is more probable than its
non-existence.""' 2
Although the rules are intricate, the Code and its comments in this re-
spect are clearer than was the N.I.L. There is no longer any necessity to
continue the conflict in the cases as to the weight of the presumption or the
burden on either party. It is also clear that in this area the Code, by its
plain interpretation, repeals evidentiary statutes and court rules in the juris-
dictions where it is effective. It reduces considerably the rights of holders in
due course under the N.I.L. in some cases, and increases them in others.
On careful consideration, however, no tears should be shed over this be-
cause a holder in due course as such is one in a position to take advantage
of the misfortune of another, his rights are statutory, and clarity is more
important than the equities.
C. Suits to Establish Title to Commercial Paper
When one turns from suits on the instrument itself to the numerous cases
in which there is a contest between holders and owners or others who claim
title to or rights in the paper, a totally different situation exists. Suppose,
107. See Imperial Consumer Serv., Inc. v. Walton, 78 Mont. Co. L.R. 37, 39
(Pa. C.P. 1960); U.C.C. §§ 3-305(2)(a)-(e). The expression "all defenses" in sub-
section (2) is likely to be misleading. To those listed should be added: alteration,
U.C.C. § 3-407, and unauthorized signature, U.C.C. § 3-404.
108. u.c.c. §§ 3-305(l),(2).
109. U.C.C. § 3-307(3).
110. 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS, § 3-307, reason. See BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note
102, at 876-82 (and cases there cited). Comments to U.C.C. § 3-307 indicate that the
minority cases no longer have any weight.
111. U.C.C. § 3-307, comment 3.
112. U.C.C. § 1-201(8).
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for example, (1) a former holder sues a present holder 13 alleging and prov-
ing that he is or was the rightful owner or has other legal claims to bearer
paper or paper containing his endorsement. At this point it was clear under
N.I.L. section 59 that the present holder prevails because "every holder
is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due course." Suppose further, (2),
the plaintiff shows that he was deprived of the paper by fraud, theft, loss, or
the like. It is clear under N.I.L. section 59 that the burden of proof now
shifts to the holder. 14 How is it under the Code?
In (1) above you would anwser that it is clear that the holder prevails.
How do you know? If a chattel or non-negotiable paper were involved it
is clear the plaintiff would prevail or that the burden would be on the de-
fendant to come forward with proof of estoppel, acquiescence, or the like.
Under Code section 3-306 "unless he has the rights of the holder in due
course, any person takes the instrument subject to (a) all valid claims to it
on the part of any person."'15 Now does he have the "rights of the holder in
due course?" The statute is silent. Where is the presumption?
The draftsmen seem to think that section 3-307 (2) was a substitute for the
presumption in N.I.L. section 59; but as already indicated section 3-307 by
its context is definitely limited to suits on the instrument. What is more,
section 3-307(2)"16 authorizes the "holder to recover on it unless the de-
fendant establishes a defense." In the instant case, the suit is not on the
instrument and the holder is the defendant; so by no proper interpretation
can the section be said to apply to the case where the holder is being sued.
It should be further noted that the entire section is discussing "defenses,"
whereas the case involves a "claim." It is therefore clear that section 3-307
does not cover the case. Is there any other pertinent section?
Diligent search has not revealed any pertinent section other than
section 1-202."" An examination of this section indicates that it covers only
third-party documents like bills of lading and the like, and was so in-
tended."' It purports only to raise a presumption of genuineness and by no
means can it be stretched to one of holding in due course or can it shift the
burden of proof; so it seems fair to say that the Code is silent on a suit be-
113. For the definition of holder see U.C.C. § 1-201 (20).
114. For the wording of this section see note 57 supra. Observe the use of the
concept of defective title.
115. See also U.C.C. § 3-207(2).
116. For the wording of this subsection see note 67 supra.
117. Prima Facie Evidence by Third Party Documents.
A document in due form purporting to be a bill of lading, policy or certificate of in-
surance, official weigher's or inspector's certificate, consular invoice, or any other
document authorized or required by the contract to be issued by a third party
shall be prima facie evidence of its own authenticity and genuineness and of the
facts stated in the document by the third party.
118. See U.C.C. § 1-202, comment 2.
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tween claimants of the same negotiable instrument. This includes both
cases (1) and (2) above.
Here one is faced with the problem of construing the silence of the Code.
Unfortunately, after over fifteen hundred years of applying codes and a
much longer experience of trying cases, the legal profession seems to have
developed no empirical science of applying statutes or determining facts in
court.11 One is remitted to the nebulous legal maxims, rules of construc-
tion, and habits of the bar. As indicated by Dean Pound in the article
quoted above,12 the civil law lawyers, who have a much longer experience
with codes, have an entirely different technique than do their common law
brethren.
What, then, are the possibilities of solving this important problem? There
are at least five different approaches available, all of which have support in
the habits of the bar, the intent of the framers, the common law, court
decisions, or a combination of one or all of these sources. These are (A)
interpretation of the repeal of the N.I.L., (B) carrying forward the court
decisions since the N.I.L., (C) return to the common law cases before the
N.I.L., (D) construction of the rules based upon analogy to other provisions
of the Commercial Code, and (E) resort to statutes and rules of court in
various jurisdictions where the cases may be tried.
First, what can be made of repeal of the N.I.L. (A above)? It is clear
that the Commercial Code of necessity repealed most of the uniform laws in
its field, including specifically, the N.I.L."2' This repeal covers N.I.L. section
59 and is not saved by the general repealers action repealing "all acts
and parts of acts inconsistent with this act." '22
There are at least three recognized ways of interpreting repeal. (a) The
act repealed is wiped out and the opposite result is intended (negative in-
ference) ; (b) the act was repealed because it was unnecessary, but the same
rule is therefore continued; (c) the act was wiped out in favor of a return
to the law as if the statute did not exist.12
119. It was to be expected that the Chicago Jury Study might shed some light on
this problem.
120. Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REv. 383 (1908).
121. U.C.C. 1 0-102(l).
122. U.C.C. § 10-103.
123. One desiring to pursue the subject will find the following interesting. CRAES,
STATUTE LAW 294 (4th ed. Scott 1936); DWARRIS, TREATISE ON STATUTES 160 (Potter
ed. 1871); MAXWELL, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 390 (11th ed. Wilson & Gelpin
1962); SDGOwICK, INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 116 (2d ed. Pomeroy 1874); SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 544
(Lewis ed. 1904). An examination of these authorities will reveal that this subject is
further complicated by acts of Parliament and many state constitutions and statutes.
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(a) If one follows the illogical negative inference from repeal, he might
reach the result that the presumption is against the holder being a holder in
due course, and the burden is upon him to prove he is. This interpretation
might receive some support from the substantive provisions of sections
3-207(2) and 3-306. The former provides "Except as against a subse-
quent holder in due course ... negotiation is ... subject to rescission...
or any other remedy permitted by law," and the latter, "unless he has the
ights of a holder in due course any person takes the instruments subject to
(a) all valid claims to it on the part of any person." Since the rights of a
holder in due course in both sections are exceptional, and since the pre-
sumptions and burden of proof were provided only in cases where the
holder was the plaintiff, it might be argued, again by negative inference,
that the holder has the burden of establishing his affirmative defense, i.e.,
that he is a holder in due course. Such an argument is illogical and seems
to sicken one acquainted with the law of bills and notes before the enact-
ment of the Code. But who is to say that some court may not find it
appealing?
(b) The second proposition can be stated about as follows: everybody
knows a holder is presumed to be a holder in due course, so the first sentence
of N.I.L. section 59 was repealed as unnecessary. There is considerable
support for this kind of argument in many of the Commissioners' comments,
which seem to indicate that they regard the Code as a sort of restatement
of the case law.'24 Although it disregards the nature of statutory law and
its place in constitutional structure of the states, this argument has a virtue
that it results in continuity of the "law" when nothing more is said on the
point.
(c) The third proposition has much support in the writing of the au-
thorities on the subject of statutory interpretation and construction. 2 " If
one turns to the "law" as if the N.I.L. did not exist he is first remitted to
the effect of the cases and the common law (B and C above).
The cases and the common law in the field are both of dubious authority.
Whether or not they are to be carried forward depends upon whether or
not they were decided before or after enactment of the N.I.L.
As to those cases decided after the enactment of the N.I.L. there is con-
siderable difficulty. There are two arguments as to these cases. First, is
124. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-302, comment 1; 3-419, comment 5; 4-103, comment 2;
7-203, comment; 7-301, comment 3; 7-501, comment 1; 8-202(1), comment 1; 8-208,
comments. Compare Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Consolidated Fisheries Co., 190 F.2d
817, 822 n.9 (3d Cir. 1951), with United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674
(2d Cir. 1966).
125. See authorities cited note 123 supra.
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the one set forth by Landis that cases decided under the statutes may become
part of the common law.' The common law is, of course, consulted when
the statute is silent. Second, granting Landis' position that these cases may
be absorbed into the common law and therefore may be pertinent when
the Code is silent, what is the effect of the repeal of the statute under
which they were decided? To continue to give them the effect of "law"
after repeal of the supporting statute is to defy the laws of legal gravitation,
yet there is much support for this sort of thing in the comments to the
Code.12 As a practical matter, this interpretation preserves all of the con-
flict in the cases under N.I.L. section 59,128 which the Code was supposed to
remove.
This remits us to the "common law" before the enactment of the uni-
form laws (C above). Here again the comments to the Code often refer
to such "law' '12 ' as the basis for rules set out in the Code. As often pointed
out before,"' this "common law" of bills and notes is largely a fiction, and
to return to it in this case would lead to a gap of almost fifty years in the
law of most states."' It would also require the return to the authority of
ancient cases or statutes in each state, which, if they exist, were in a state
of chaos.
Perhaps a better result can be reached by construction of rules based
upon articles of the Code (D above). As already indicated, the Code offers
satisfactory rules for handling cases in which the holder sues a prior party on
the instrument. Why not apply similar rules to contests between holders
and other parties with claims on the instrument? This could be accom-
plished simply by treating section 3-307(2) as if it said, "production of the
instrument entitles a holder to recover on it or retain clear title to it unless
the defendant establishes a defense or valid claim to it." Then treat
subsection 3-307(3) to read, "After it is shown that a defense or claim
exists." The rights of the parties would then be determined by a uniform
procedure in all cases whether the holder was the plaintiff or the defend-
ant. This is the first type of construction advocated by Pound in the ma-
terial quoted above'32 and would correspond to the approved manner of
applying codes in Europe.
126. Landis, Statutes and Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEOAL EssAYs 213 (1934).
127. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 3-415, comment 4; 3-503, comment 1; 3-803, comment;
7-501, comment 4; 8-304, comment 1; 8-306, comment 3.
128. See BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 102, at 859-91.
129. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 3-303(a), comment 3 (returning to idea of value before
N.I.L.); 3-413, comment (Price v. Neal); 3-417, comment 4 (Price v. Neal); 3-418, com-
ments 1, 2 (Price v. Neal).
130. See BRANNAN, Op. cit. supra note 102, at 72.
131. The N.I.L. was enacted over a period from 1897 to 1933. See id. at 1356-60.
132. Pound, supra note 120, at 385.
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This simple and practical construction has only one difficulty. In juris-
dictions which have practice statutes or court rules affecting this problem
(E above), one would run into the well-established common law rule of
construction that statutes are not to be carried beyond their plain meaning
to repeal other statutes.133 These practice acts are legion.13' An examina-
tion of them is beyond the scope of this paper and should be left to scholars
of evidence. Court rules, either as delegated legislation 3 ' or on their own
authority, are also common but too complicated to be examined here. It
is clear that these are superseded by the Code in cases in which the holder
is the plaintiff. There is also every reason in simplified practice and in the
interest of uniformity as commanded by sections 1-102 (1) (a) and (c) why
they should be overturned by the suggested construction of section 3-307.
There is no necessity for courts in construing code statutes in the last half
of the twentieth century, when most of our law is statutory, to be bound by
medieval rules created when statutes were exceptional and cases were the
body of the law. To refuse to so construe the Code would be to admit
that it has introduced unbearable intricacies and confusions into the plead-
ing and practice of cases involving negotiable paper.
D. The Presumptions as They Affect Securities-Article 8
In cases involving securities there are the same classifications of the effect
of presumption as in the cases of commercial paper: presumptions of hold-
ing in due course generally, in suits on the paper, and in contests over title
to the paper.
As is the case in Article 3 there seems to be no general presumption that
a holder is a bona fide purchaser. 36 So far as the reissue of securities is
133. See BLAcK, THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 351,
367 (2d ed. 1911); DwASus, op. cit. supra note 123, at 154. Now just give this a little
nudge and apply it to common law statutes and court rules. See CRAmns, op. cit. supra
note 123, at 308.
134. E.g., CAL. Evm. CODE §§ 637, 660; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 43(4)
(1956); see Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12
STAN. L. Rav. 5, 24 (1959). For an example of the proliferation of these statutes
see 10 WiomoRn, EvmNcE 24-125 (1940). By no means all these statutes apply to this
problem; but they give some indication of the research necessary to collect all this ma-
terial.
135. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1964); FED. R. CIv. P. 8(c); ILL. RV. STAT.
ch. 110, § 2 (Supp. 1966).
136. In spite of the fact that the definition of "holder" in § 1-201(20) applies to
investment securities, and in spite of strenuous criticism, e.g., Beutel, The Proposed Uni-
form [?] Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334, 341 (1952);
Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Commercial Code As a Problem in Codification, 16 LAw
& CONT MP. PRoa. 141, 152-53 (1951), U.C.C. § 8-302 uses the term "bona fide pur-
chaser."
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concerned, there seems to be a duty to inquire into the rights of a holder; 3 "
and the transferee, with the exception of a bona fide purchaser, gets the
rights of his transferor in the same manner as in commercial paper."8
In suits on the security, section 8-105 (2) sets out almost verbatim section
3-307 as it applies to securities." 9  With minor variations,""0 then, the
presumptions and burden of proof in suits on securities should be almost
the same as in suits on commercial paper discussed above.
When one turns to contests between claimants to the same security,
which are far more numerous than suits on the security itself, Article 8
like Article 3, is eloquent in its silence in regard to presumptions and burden
of proof. To be sure, the presumption of genuineness can be reached by
easy analogy to section 8-105(2), even though it specifically covers only
suits on securities. There is the ever present opposite analogy to sections
137. U.C.C. §§ 8-401 to -403 contrast to the rights to pay commercial paper under
U.C.C. § 3-603.
138. Compare U.C.C. § 8-315, with U.C.C. §§ 3-306 and 3-207(2).
139. The subsection reads:
(2) In any action on a security
(a) unless specifically denied in the pleadings, each signature on the
security or in a necessary indorsement is admitted;
(b) when the effectiveness of a signature is put in issue the burden of
establishing it is on the party claiming under the signature but the
signature is presumed to be genuine or authorized;
(c) when signatures are admitted or established production of the instru-
ment entitles a holder to recover on it unless the defendant establishes
a defense or a defect going to the validity of the security; and
(d) after it is shown that a defense or defect exists the plaintiff has the
burden of establishing that he or some person under whom he claims
is a person against whom the defense or defect is ineffective (section
8-202).
Compare U.C.C. § 8-105(2), with U.C.C. 2 3-307 (set out in note 67 supra). It should
be noted that "defect" as used in U.C.C. § 8-105(2) (c)-(d) is a sort of "real defense,"
U.CC. § 8-202, and not a "defect of title" as used in the N.I.L.
140. It should be noted that the draftsmen removed the earlier direct deference to the
remedies of U.C.C. § 3-307, 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS 226-27, and restated the section
clearly limiting it to "actions on the security." They also made certain changes in subsec-
tion (3) requiring the holder to show that he was "in all respects a holder in due course."
These changes may make some difference in the procedure and in the results discussed
above. See note 80 supra; U.C.C. §§ 8-202; 8-204; 8-304 to -305; 8-308; 8-401 to -403.
In all respects a "holder in due course" also had to be changed to "a person against
whom the defense or defect is ineffective" because the requirements of taking with
freedom from claims and defenses are different. The former is covered by U.C.C. § 8-
302, which requires value, good faith, and no notice; the latter is in U.C.C. § 8-202(4),
which requires only purchase for value and no notice of the "particular" defense. It is
doubtful if the draftsmen meant to leave out good faith. See U.C.C. § 1-203. U.C.C.
§ 8-202, comment 4, uses the expression "bona fide purchaser" in this context. This is
further evidence that the Code was intended as a collection of special statutes rather
than a general enactment of the law.
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8-401 to -403, which require issuers to inquire into the signature before
they reissue securities. There are also sections 8-304, 8-305, and 8-310
which charge holders with, or withhold from them, certain claims which
raise nice questions of proof of facts leading to substantive results. 4' Here
again there is a silence as to presumptions and burden. In these circum-
stances there are the same considerations of the effect of the repeal of N.I.L.
section 59, the force of previous cases, and the authoritative rules of prac-
tice which are present under Article 3, discussed at length above.
There is one further consideration. Article 8, Investment Securities, is
a codification and combination of the laws of three fields: negotiable bonds,
formerly controlled by the N.I.L.; stocks, previously governed by the Uni-
form Stock Transfer Act; and bonds, non-negotiable by the N.I.L., subject
to the common law and to numerous state statutes. Here, if one takes the
traditional historical approach to the subject, the considerations would be
even more complicated than they were under Article 3, Commercial Paper.
It seems, however, that it should be recognized that "securities" are a new
legal device created and governed by the Code. It would, in the absence of
clear provisions to the contrary in the Code itself, be better to apply the
analogies of section 8-105 uniformly to all proof in suits on or involving
title to securities. If this is done, there will be a uniform method of pro-
cedure for commercial paper and securities.
One court of first instance has required of the claimant of an admittedly
validly indorsed stock certificate the burden of proving a defect in a nego-
tiation to the holder." This is a good beginning.
B. Documents of Title, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof-Article 7
Article 7 of the Code, on Warehouse Receipts, Bills of Lading, and
Other Documents of Title, like the uniform laws it replaces, seems to have
no provisions affecting the problem at hand. To be sure, as indicated
above, section 1-202 has a provision for prima facie authority of third party
documents,'43 specifically including bills of lading and, by inference, other
documents of title; but it contains no presumptions on holding in due
course or provisions on shifting the burden of proof. The fact that this sec-
tion, found in a general article on principles of interpretation, overlooks
most of the subject matter of this paper, and the fact that the rest of the
141. See Welland Investment Corp. v. First Natl Bank, 81 N.J. Super. 180, 195
A.2d 210 (1963) (not citing U.C.C. § 8-105).
142. Morrison v. Liberty Discount & Sav. Bank, 61 Lack. Jur. 37 (Pa. C.P. 1958)
(again the court did not cite U.C.C. § 8-105).
143. For the text of this section see note 117 supra. See also U.C.O. § 7-501, com-
ment 4. Just what is meant by this comment is not clear.
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Code treats it only in a fragmentary fashion, is further proof of the com-
partmentalized thinking of the draftsmen.
Here again, there arises the problem of construing silence. Unlike the
sections already discussed, Article 7 seems to be silent on the matter of
burden of proof both in suits on the document and in contests to determine
title to the paper or the goods which it represents. Since the previous uni-
form laws also contain no provisions on this point, it would be a good place
to argue for a continuation of the common law cases, if indeed previous
cases could be considered "common law."
Here an interesting problem of construction arises. Although the previous
uniform laws also appear to be silent on this particular point, their com-
missioners' notes contain many references indicating that in the area of
negotiability they intended to adopt the rules in regard to negotiable bills
and notes. " Mr. Williston, the draftsman of the Acts, stated this in-
tention in his treatise on sales,"4 5 and also spoke often of the apparent
ownership of holders of documents of title."4 G Some cases decided under
these statutes are even more specific in stating the rule almost verbatim as
it was under N.I.L. section 59,"47 and citing interchangeably cases under
the N.I.L. and under other uniform statutes.
If ever there was a place where an argument could be made in the face
of silence in the Code for a continuation of the rules of the cases, this seems
to be it. However, N.I.L. section 59, the statutory foundation of the rule,
has been repealed; also the cases, as indicated above, were not entirely
uniform."" The Code, where it covers the subject, uses different language
and gets different results. It might be wise in the interest of uniformity
as required by section 1-102, to construe the sections cited above broadly
and apply them to all cases of the burden of proof arising under Article 7.
This would also be in accord with the tradition of those cases which applied
the rule of N.I.L. section 59 to documents of title under the previous uni-
form laws. It would also follow the code construction as developed by ex-
perience and understood in the civil law world.
144. Commissioners' Notes to the following sections: B.L.A. §§ 26, 28, 31, 34, 35,
41, 51, 52, 53; S.A. §§ 27, 28, 29, 35, 36, 37, and substitute §§ 32, 38; W.R.A.
§§ 38-40, and substitute §§ 40, 44, 56, 58. See BEUTEL, UNIFORM LAWS, CASES AND
MATERIALS (Supp. 1950).
145. 2 WILLISTON, SALES § 408 (1948).
146. Id. at §§ 291-92.
147. See, e.g., Greenwood Grocery Co. v. Canadian County Mill, 72 S.C. 450, 52
S.E. 191 (1905); Young v. Harris-Cortner Co., 152 Tenn. 34, 268 S.W. 1120 (1925);
National Bank v. Chatfield, 118 Tenn. 481, 101 S.W. 765 (1907).
148. See Annot., 18 A.L.R. 18 (1922).
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V. THE NECESSITY AND TECHNIQUE OF AMENDMENT
Although it seems that the construction suggested above is a sensible, if
not a simple, way to take care of the hiatuses in the Code as to the effect
of presumptions and burden of proof in cases, it still does not solve the
problem of presumptions of holding in due course outside of the cases
between the parties and claimants which are covered by N.I.L. section 59.
It may well be that the repeal has killed all the advantages which accrued
to an apparent holder outside of court. One need not cry crocodile tears
if this has happened because the holder of negotiable paper already has too
many advantages for the social good. But has it? The complicated rules
here suggested are not some nightmare dreamed up by a carping critic,
they are a bona fide attempt to simplify and unify the written law of the
land. There is now the question of whether or not our court system can
digest such technical changes without shattering the methods of pleading
and practice. If they cannot, the damage flags are flying. Perhaps lawyers
will not change their habits. Perhaps the judicial process of digesting
radical new fragmentary rules will be too slow. It may be that judicial
procedural reform is already overdue and the Code only indicates a wider
necessity. Perhaps businessmen will tire of the whole judicial process and
adopt other methods of settling their disputes.
The present Code and the organization surrounding and sponsoring it
offer two solutions: (1) creation of new rules by contract between mem-
bers of the business community, which may entirely shortcircuit the cumber-
some and complicated judicial administration of the rules of the Commer-
cial Code; (2) constant study and reorganization of the Code itself.
(1) The first alternative, the creation by contract of new rules and pro-
cedures by which the business community can govern itself outside of and
in spite of the Commercial Code, was contemplated and approved by the
draftsmen. Article 1 states this purpose,"" and the legislative history shows
149. Section 1-102. Purposes; Rules of Construction; Variation by Agreement.
(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its under-
lying purposes and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions;(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.(3) The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as
otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good faith, dili-
gence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by
agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which
the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not
manifestly unreasonable.
(4) The presence in certain provisions of this Act of the words "unless other-
wise agreed" or words of similar import does not imply that the effect of other pro-
visions may not be varied by agreement under subsection (3).
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the intent to give it full effect.15 There are also many other sections allow-
ing commercial contracts to supersede the Code. 5' The Code also approves
many self-help remedies resting in the hands of businessmen, bankers, and
creditors.15" ' The practical workings of these extra-legal devices are not
always in line with the fairness demanded by a good legal order.'53 These
provisions carry the danger that sophisticated, rich, and powerful businesses
may, by standard contract provisions or procedures, take advantage of
their unsophisticated and poorer customers. This practice is already well
established in the consumer credit field, and is likely to spread under the
benign influence of the Code.
The Code also contains an even greater threat to the balance of the
market. The provisions of section 4-103 allowing change not only by agree-
ment of the parties but also by "Federal Reserve regulations, operating
letters, clearing house rules, and the like" give third parties power over
transactions where the consumer cannot protect himself. The unfairness
and danger of these provisions have already been commented upon by the
writer, 5' with the approval of one of the draftsmen, 5 and need not be
further elucidated here, except to point out that giving businessmen the
right to supersede the law by agreement contains dangers now being graph-
ically illustrated by the riots in Chicago and elsewhere. The economic
causes here are by no means limited to color but can be traced to unfair
business practices which affect all races" '
(2) The second method of improvement by constant revision offers
intriguing possibilities which are being developed by the American Law
Institute and the Commissioners.
150. 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS 1-3. See also N.Y.L.R.C. Report 357 (1956); N.Y.
L.R.C. Study 141-56 (1955).
151. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-303; 2-316; 3-511(2)(a), (5); 4-103; 5-102(2);
5-106(1); 5-110(2); 5-111; 7-202(3); 7-204; 7-303; 8-107; 8-202(1). Seen also Loise-
aux, Default Proceedings Under the Texas Uniform Commercial Code, 44 TEXAs L. R.Ev.
702 (1966). How far this policy applies to Article 9 should be the basis of a separate
study.
152. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-209, 2-316, 2-706, 4-212, 9-503, 9-504. See also Norton
v. National Bank, 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966). These are only a few. Many
more can be found.
153. For example, note the workings of service charges for overdrawn checks. BEUTEL
& NzoRoN, THE OPERATION OF THE BAD CHEcic LAWS OF PUERTO Rico 20, 53, 55
(1966).
154. See Beutel, supra note 136.
155. Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply To Professor Beutel, 61 YALE
L.J. 364, 375-77 (1952).
156. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1966, p. 391, col. 4 (city ed.).
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VI. THE POSSIBILITIES OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD
While the Code was in the hands of the New York Law Revision Com-
mission as indicated above, a new editorial board was created to consider
amendments. This board has now been made permanent and is in the
continuing process of considering and recommending amendments to the
Code. The procedure is to study the suggested amendments, draft them,
and circulate them "among all state bar associations, all state banker asso-
ciations, all state chambers of commerce, all state legislative reference
bureaus, or similar agencys, and all services reporting decisions under the
Code."'T After a proper length of time, the board then approves recom-
mendations in the form of amendments which are suggested to state legis-
latures for enactment.
Whether or not the definitive problems raised in this paper are considered
a proper basis for amendments, it is clear that the Permanent Editorial
Board represents an important step forward in the development of the
science of legislation. It is in the spirit of the recommendations of Mr.
Justice Cardozo for a ministry of justice,"" and in accordance with the
latest developments in experimental jurisprudence and systems engineer-
ing.159
There are at least three difficulties which beset the board as presently
constituted. (1) There may be considerable doubt whether it is properly
representative of the interests involved in the operation of the Code. (2) It
does not seem to have the resources, staff, or motivation to make proper
empirical studies of the operation of the Code. (3) The practical problem
of getting a flow of continuing amendments, which are certain to come,
adopted by over fifty legislatures is at present beyond solution.
(1) There is no doubt that the present method of choosing the board
leaves out of consideration such great economic interests as consumers,
labor, and the general public. The fact that the American Law Institute
and the Commissioners on Uniform Laws, in spite of their diligent desire
to operate pro bono publico, are private law-making organizations not
representative of the needs of the society has been pointed out at length else-
where and need not be further elucidated here.' It is therefore essential
157. Schnader, Report as Chairman, Commercial Code Committee, Commissioners
on Uniform Laws, 1966 Meeting, Montreal, p. 4.
158. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARv. L. REV. 113 (1921).
159. See BEUTEL, DEmOCRACY OR THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN LAW AND POLICY
MAKING 133 (1965). Massachusetts has a special commission empowered to amend the
Code. Mass. Acts 1957, ch. 756, § 20, at 938.
160. See Beutel, Law Making by Professional and Trade Associations, 34 NEa. L.
REv. 431 (1955); BEUTEL, op. cit. supra note 159, at 60.
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that although this board is an excellent beginning, it must be made more
representative of the public in general and should not remain an appendage
of the organized bar alone. This might be accomplished by attaching it
to the Council of State Governments or by an interstate compact as sug-
gested below.
(2) The board as presently organized is largely a voluntary service or-
ganization. It depends for material upon court decisions or spontaneous
suggestions brought to it. A commercial code, if it is successful, will regulate
the everyday activities of the people in the fantastic depth which is our
modem complicated society. Many of the present maladjustments do not
get to court nor do they come to the attention of legal scholars. Business
organizations and professional reports are certain to be slanted, and the
public interest is missed. Only carefully directed, scientific, social research
can reveal the real workings of the law. This requires a permanent staff
and large continuing expenditures of money, which, over the long run, will
make the nearly one million dollars spent up to now on the Code seem
like small change. So the present board is without resources as well as
economic distribution of interest to handle such a problem.
(3) The third difficulty, getting a legislature to adopt suggested amend-
ments, is the practical stumbling block upon which the project is certain
to fall even if it can meet the other two objections. The board has already
suggested numerous amendments; but their reception by the states has been
pretty dismal."6' It is not surprising that the legislatures, having adopted
on faith a modem Code which was to solve the problems of unifying the
commercial law, will look with jaundiced eyes upon a steady flow of
amendments to the Code. So it is not surprising that only about a third
of those approached have approved the amendments. In addition, there
are local eager beaver legislatures which have succeeded in getting 750 non-
uniform amendments into 244 of the Code's 399 sections as originally
adopted in the forty-nine jurisdictions." 2 These gentlemen and their kind
are not likely to approve deletion of their handywork. The history of at-
tempts to amend the old uniform laws, which were failures, gives some in-
dication of what is to be expected in the way of resistance to amendments.'6 3
But no man, or group of men, is able to create a code which will not have
to be changed to keep up with the advances in our dynamic society. So no
161. See Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, Report No. 1
(1962).
162. See Schnader, supra note 157, at 2. For an earlier compilation see Permanent
Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, Report No. 2 (1965).
163. See Schnader, supra note 157, at 3.
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matter how good one thinks the Code is, amendments are necessary and
the Permanent Editorial Board is a step in the right direction.
How then, can the board be organized so that it will be at the same time
well balanced, well staffed, and effective in keeping the law up to date?
There are two possibilities. Such a board might be created by a compact
between the states with delegated power to make the necessary amendments
to the law of all jurisdictions, and with appropriations sufficient to meet
the need. This idea, though intriguing, and constitutional, is almost too
impractical for consideration. Our outmoded system of separate states is
not likely to reorganize itself in this fashion.
Mr. Schnader has suggested a second excellent possibility, the enactment
of a United States Commercial Code. '6 If we are ever to get complete or
substantial uniformity then this will be necessary. If McClung's Barbecue
stand in Atlanta is subject to the commerce clause of the federal con-
stitution, 6' then there is power in the federal government to regulate
"Commerce with the foreign Nations and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes"'"6 by way of a uniform commercial code. Before
this is attempted, the Congress should create an impartial body to study
the problems with a view to passing a code and delegating to a federal ad-
ministrative body the power to promulgate necessary amendments in much
the same manner as they created the Federal Aviation Agency.67
To adopt the present Code with a few amendments intended to fit it for
federal enactment would only lead to more trouble.
164. See Schnader, supra note 157, at 7.
165. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
166. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
167. For this history see BEUTEL, op. cit. supra note 159, at 209.
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